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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RALPH L. WADSWORTH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Petition No.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH,
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION,

Priority No. 13

Defendants/Appellants,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Plaintiff

and

Appellee, Ralph

L. Wadsworth

Construction

Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth"), pursuant to Rules 46-49 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully petitions the Court for
Writ of Certiorari. This Petition is made on the grounds that (1)
the issues presented are important questions of municipal and state
law and, (2) the Court of Appeals did not address or rule upon the
primary points presented on appeal /hich is a departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings sufficient to
call for exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether

a wrongfully

rejected

bidder

on

a

public

construction project is entitled to any monetary relief, is an
important question of municipal and state law which should be
decided by the Supreme Court.
1

2.

Whether

covenants

between

contractor,

where

consideration

the

contractual

a

municipality

significant

were

accepted

enforceability
and

mutual
by

the

a

of

pre-award

competitive

obligations
parties,

is

bidding

supported
an

by

important

question of municipal and state law which should be decided by the
Supreme Court.
3.
upon

the

departure

Whether the Court of Appeals1 failure to address or rule
primary
from

points
the

presented

accepted

and

on

appeal

usual

is

course

a
of

sufficient
judicial

proceedings to call for exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision.
REPORTS OF DECISIONS
The decision of the Court of Appeals has been reported at 170
Utah Adv.Rep. 52 (Ct.App., 9/30/91).
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
(A)

The Court of Appeals Decision sought to be reviewed was

entered September 30, 1991.
(B)

An order of the Utah Court of Appeals denying rehearing

was entered on December 17, 1991.
(C)

The statutory authority for exercise of jurisdiction is

Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended).
CONTROLLING LAWS
The following are the controlling provisions of the Salt Lake
County Ordinances involved in the case.
Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1:
Except as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase
orders and contracts of every kind, involving amounts in
2

excess of $5,000,00, for labor and services, or for the
purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials,
equipment or supplies, shall be let by competitive
bidding after advertisement, to the lowest responsible
bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the highest
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is
to expend or to receive the money.
Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-5:
Any and all bids received in response to an advertisement
may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if
the bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character
or quality of services, supplies, materials, equipment
or labor does not conform to requirements, or if the
public interest may otherwise be served thereby.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case

involves the competitive bidding

of a public

construction project for Salt Lake County known as Scott Avenue.
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East "No. 408" ("The Project") . Appellee
Ralph

L.

Wadsworth

Construction

Company,

Inc.

("Wadsworth")

contends that Salt Lake County ("the County") wrongfully rejected
its bid and failed to award the project contract to Wadsworth as
the low, responsive, responsible bidder.

Wadsworth seeks to

recover for the wrongful rejection of its bid and breach of
contract by Salt Lake County.

The District Court entered Summary

Judgment in favor of Wadsworth.
Course of Proceedings Below
On August 14, 1985, Salt Lake County determined Wadsworthfs
Bid on the subject public construction project was non-responsive
due to isolated and occasional pencil notations among the bid
figures entered in ink on the Bid. (R. 278-80) . On or about August
22, 1985, Salt Lake County awarded the project to the second low
3

bidder, Gerber Construction.

(R. 80).

On August 26, 1985,

Wadsworth filed this action and moved for injunctive relief to
preserve the status quo pending the resolution of this dispute. (R.
2, 28).

On August 26, 1985, a hearing was held regarding the

injunctive relief sought by Wadsworth and the District Court
entered a temporary restraining order on August 26, 1985.
42-44).

(R. 86,

Further hearings were subsequently held on September 3

and 5, 1985, regarding injunctive relief.

(R. 28, 86).

At the September 5, 1985, hearing on Wadsworth1s Motion for
Injunctive Relief, the District Court, determined that Wadsworth's
bid was responsive, that the penciled notations should have been
ignored as not part of the bid, that Salt Lake County wrongfully
rejected Wadsworth's bid, and that the project should have been
awarded to Wadsworth as the lowest responsible bidder.

(R. 176-

77) . 1
After the hearing, Wadsworth submitted
granting the injunctive relief.

(R. 86).

a proposed order

The County filed an

objection to the order and another hearing was subsequently held
on the County's objection on September 13, 1985.

Although the

Court had initially determined to grant an injunction, (R. 28) , the
extended hearings and lapse of time permitted the second low bidder
to continue on the project, thereby rendering injunctive relief

At the hearing of September 5, 1985, the County indicated
that work had already begun on the project by the second low
bidder. Wadsworth, emphasized at the hearing that it was prepared
to make any monetary adjustment necessary to avoid any prejudice
to the County and the second low bidder in awarding the project to
Wadsworth as required. (R. 157-61).
4

impractical. (R. 97). On November 22, 1985, the Court entered an
Order denying the injunction, (R. 97), thereby leaving Wadsworth
to pursue a remedy of damages, characterized by the Court as
"incurring more costs to the County". (R. 177).
Salt Lake County subsequently moved for summary judgment on
the basis that no remedy was available to Wadsworth for the
wrongful rejection of its bid.

(R. 110). The County's Motion was

denied on July 20, 1987. (R. 190). Wadsworth thereafter moved for
summary

judgment

on

its claim

for damages

rejection of its bid. (R. 224-84).

for

the wrongful

The District Court granted

Wadsworth's Motion on December 14, 1989. (R. 429-431).

The County

filed its Notice of Appeal on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-35).
The Court of Appeals entered its opinion reversing the Summary
Judgment on September 30, 1991. Wadsworth's petition for rehearing
was denied December 17, 1991.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

On July 8, 1985, defendant Salt Lake County issued a

public invitation to bid with Instructions to Bidders and Bid
Schedule for the construction of Scott Avenue Basin on Millcreek
at 800 East "No. 408".
2.

(R. 7, 246, 278).

The last page of the Bid Schedule, Section 1.8.00, page

6, of the subject bid documents, contains the following provision:
The award of contract, if made, will be to the lowest
responsive, responsible bidder pursuant to county
ordinance. The county reserves the right to delete any
bid schedule or item and to award any portion of the work
depending upon the availability of the funds.
(R. 262).
5

3.

Section 1.2.06, on page two of the Instructions to

Bidders, includes the following language requiring the low bidder
to enter into a written contract with the County:
Each proposal must be accompanied by a bid bond or a
certified check on a bank in Salt Lake County, for 5% of
the amount bid, which amount is agreed to by the bidder
as liquidated damages due to Salt Lake County if he shall
fail to execute the contract and furnish the required
bonds, all within ten days after the acceptance of the
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the Board
of County Commissioners.
(R. 247).
4.
documents

The bid bond required by Salt Lake County under the bid
contained

the

following

provision

requiring

and

guaranteeing, inter alia, that the contractor not withdraw his bid
within the period specified or within 60 days after bid opening.
Now, therefore, if the principal shall not withdraw said
bid within the period specified therein after the opening
of the same, or if no period be specified, within sixty
(60) days after said opening, and shall within the period
specified therefor, or, if no period be specified, within
ten (10) days after the prescribed forms are presented
to him for signature, enter into a written contract with
the County, in accordance with the bid as accepted, and
give bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties,
as may be required, for the faithful performance and
proper fulfillment of such contract, or in the event of
the withdrawal of said bid within the period specified,
or the failure to enter into such contract and give such
bond within the time specified, if the principal shall
pay the County the difference or failure to enter into
such contract and give such bond within the time
specified, if the principal shall pay the County the
difference between the amount specified in said bid and
the amount for which the County may procure the required
work and/or supplies if the latter amount be in excess
of the former, then the above obligation shall be void
and of no effect, otherwise to remain in full force and
virtue.
(R. 263).

6

5.

Section 1.2.04 of the subject Instruction to Bidders

contained the following provision requiring the bidder to submit
its bid unit prices in ink or typed:
On the bidding schedule of the proposal form the unit
prices shall be written in ink or typed both in words and
numerals. In cases of discrepancy, the amount in words
shall be construed to be the desired amount.
(R. 247)
6.

Pursuant to the invitation to bid and Instructions to

Bidders, Wadsworth submitted to Salt Lake County its bid schedule,
written in ink and its total bid was also written in ink upon the
forms specified in the contract documents.

( R. 251-62; 279; 438,

pp. 9 - 15; R. 439, pp. 7 - 8 ) .
7.

All amounts in the Bid Schedule submitted by Wadsworth

were entered in ink and the bid contained over one hundred eighty
(180) ink entries.

Inscribed upon the Bidding Schedule submitted

by Wadsworth were isolated light pencil notations. The occasional
pencil notations appeared at only five (5) places among the more
than one hundred eighty (180) separate entries in ink.

(R. 251-

62) . The County states that it has lost the original Bid Schedule
and only copies are available for scrutiny.
8.

The isolated pencil notations on the Bid Schedule were

incidental notes written during last minute telephone discussions
between Ralph Wadsworth at the County Purchasing Division and Guy
Wadsworth at Wadsworth's offices concerning the bid.

The pencil

notations do not add up or correlate with each other.

The pencil

notations were not erased due to lack of time to turn in the bid.
(R. 438 at p. 9 - 14; R. 439 at pp. 6 - 8 ) .
7

9.

At the general bid opening, on or about July 29, 1985,

Wadsworth's inked bid figure of $692,634.48 was publicly read and
Wadsworth was designated by the County's representatives as the
low apparent bidder on said project.
10.

(R. 280, 438 at p. 22).

The bid of Gerber Construction Company on the project

was the sum of $739,374.92.

(R. 281).

11. On July 31, 1985, after the bid opening, a representative
of the County, contacted Wadsworth regarding the bid submitted by
the Wadsworth and Wadsworth confirmed that its bid was in the sum
of $692,634.48.

(R. 281, 439 at pp. 8 - 9 ) . Wadsworth stated that

only the figures written in ink were intended to be part of the bid
and if it had intended to use the figures written in pencil
Wadsworth would have written them in ink.
12.

(R. 438 at pp. 12 - 14) .

Wadsworth again confirmed its bid in the amount of

$692,634.48,

in response to the contact referred

to

in the

proceeding paragraph, in a letter to Salt Lake County dated July
31, 1985. (R. 439 at p. 13).
13.

On or about August 14, 1985, Salt Lake County rejected

the bid of Wadsworth as non-responsive due to the pencil notations
on the bid and awarded the contract to the second low bidder over
the objection of Wadsworth.
14.

(R. 268-70, 272)

At the County Commission meeting concerning Wadsworth's

bid, Commissioner Barker stated that it was clear that Wadsworth
intended the inked figure of $692,634.48 as its bid.
Commission,

nevertheless,

rejected

responsive.

(R. 438 at pp. 20 - 21) .
8

Wadsworth's

bid

The County
as

non-

15.

The County admits that Wadsworth

is a responsible

contractor and bidder. (R. 282).
16.

Wadsworth

calculated

and

included

in

its bid

of

$692,643.48, an amount of $62,344.15 to be the amount of profit
Wadsworth calculated it would earn on the project if awarded the
contract.

(R. 227) .

This amount was calculated

based

upon

subcontract bids and prices for materials and labor available to
Wadsworth at the time of the project. (R. 227).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE WITHOUT ADDRESSING
THE PRIMARY ISSUES BEFORE IT, AND THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY.
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that
a writ of certiorari will be considered where "the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings...as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.

Rule 30(c)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

"When a

judgment, decree, or order is reversed...the reasons shall be
stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk."

This

necessarily implies that the opinion of the Court of Appeals must
address and rule upon all of the primary issues raised by the
parties which bear on the decision. The Court of Appeals1 decision
in this case fails to address or rule upon the primary issues
raised by Wadsworth. The practical effect of the Court of Appeals1
decision is to effectively deny Wadsworth its day in Court and a
9

Writ of Certiorari is necessary to avoid the obvious prejudice to
Wadsworth.

Clarmont Marine Sales, Inc. v. Harmon, 347 So.2d 839,

841 (Fla. 1977).
A. The Court of Appeals Failed to Address Wadsworth's Factual and
Legal Arguments that the Contractual Obligations Between the County
and Wadsworth are Authorized by Ordinance and Approved by the
County Commission.
The Court of Appeals states at page three of its opinion, that
"[n]o contract is binding on the County. . .until it has been
approved by the Board or authorized by ordinance or resolution."
The opinion then erroneously states that Wadsworth presented no
argument

that

resolution.

the

contract

was

authorized

by

ordinance

or

To the contrary, the primary thrust of Wadsworth's

brief is that Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, expressly
authorized

and

required

the

contract,

and

that

the

County

Commission approved the contract when it approved the bidding of
the project under the ordinance and provisions for contracting with
the low bidder.

(Wadsworth Brief pp. 11-16).

Wadsworth argued that Salt Lake County was authorized and
required, under its own ordinance to award the subject construction
project and contract with Wadsworth as the low, responsible bidder.
Revised Statutes of Salt Lake County, § 18-1-1, provides that the
contract

"...shall

be

let

by

competitive

bidding

advertisement, to the lowest responsible bidder..."

after

The bid

documents prepared by the County further provide that "the award
of

contract,

if made, would

be

to

the

lowest, responsive,

responsible bidder, pursuant to county ordinance."
10

(R. 262). Salt

Lake County had a mandatory duty to award the construction contract
to the low responsible bidder.2
The opinion refers to Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 2.04.1003
which requires the contract be approved by the County Commission
or

be

authorized

by

ordinance

or

resolution.

As

argued

in

Wadsworth's brief, the contract in this case was authorized and
required by County ordinance § 18-1-1, which requires contracting
with the low bidder.

The County Commission expressly approved the

contract when it approved bidding under this ordinance and the bid
instructions

requiring

the

contract

with

the

low

bidder.

Furthermore, the contract was approved by the County Commission
when it approved bidding of the project and the contract documents
upon which bids were required to be based.
16).

(Wadsworth brief, p.

Furthermore, the more specific ordinance § 18-1-1 requiring

the contract with the low bidder controls over the more generalized
ordinance § 2.04.100.

Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773

P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989).
Fowler v. City of Anchorage, 583 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska
1978); Carpet City, Inc. v. Stillwater Municipal Hospital
Authority, 536 P.2d 335 (Oklahoma 1975); Gerard Construction
Company v. City of Manchester, 415 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (N.H. 1980);
R. E. Short Company v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 343
(Minn. 1978). It has similarly been stated that "since government
by conduct sets an example for all of us, it, above all, must obey
its own laws." Swinerton & Walberg Company v. City of Inglewood,
etc. , 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974) (citing Holmstead v United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 960 (1928).
Salt Lake County was bound by its own ordinance to award the
contract to Wadsworth as the low, responsible bidder on the
project.
The designation of this ordinance at the relevant time in
this matter was Section 1-2-9, Salt Lake County Ordinances.
11

The Court of Appeals failed to address or rule upon the issue
of whether the contract was authorized by ordinance and approved
by the County commission. In fact, the opinion erroneously states
Wadsworth made no such argument. Wadsworth, therefore, is entitled
to have the Supreme Court review this matter giving consideration
to, and ruling upon, this central issue of the case.

B. The Court of Appeals1 Opinion Fails to Address the Factual and
Legal Issues Which Distinguish this Case from The Rapp Decision
upon which the Opinion was Based.
The

Court

of

Appeals1

decision

that

no

contractual

relationship existed between Salt Lake County and Wadsworth and
that the County was not required to award to Wadsworth is based
upon Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).

The

decision does not address Wadsworthfs argument that the Rapp
decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case in that
different legal issues were presented.

The Rapp case did not

involve an ordinance, as in this case, requiring award to the
lowest responsible bidder, but rather was based only upon a more
generalized ordinance requiring approval of contracts by the city
council.4

Rapp dealt only with the general common law duty of a

municipality not to act with bad faith, fraud or collusion with
respect to awarding contracts and with principles of implied
contract. The issues in this case involve express obligations, not
A

Such a
requirement in
requirement that
Floyd v. Western
1989) .

general ordinance cannot override the specific
Section 18-1-1 which contains the mandatory
the project shall be awarded to the low bidder.
Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App.
12

discussed in Rapp, imposed by County ordinance and an express
promise in the bid documents to award the project to the low
responsible bidder.

The Court of Appeals failed to address these

important distinctions.
The Rapp case was based upon the reasoning that an ordinary
invitation for bids is not an offer to be accepted by the bidder
but only a request for offers from the bidder.

In the present

case, the Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary
invitation or advertisement for bids.

The County let the project

for bid under Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, and written bid
provisions expressly providing that the project would be awarded
to the low bidder according to the contract documents upon which
the bids were based.

When Wadsworth submitted its bid, it agreed

in return to undertake significant obligations to the County. The
County required Wadsworth to covenant to hold its bid open for 60
days, to provide a bid bond on which Wadsworth was liable to the
County

and,

further, to enter

into the

final

contract upon

satisfaction of the condition that it was the lowest responsible
bidder.

(R. 247, 248, 263).

Additionally, the County's bid

documents provided for liquidated and other contractual measures
of damages in the event Wadsworth failed to enter into the contract
if it was the low bidder.

(R. 263, 247, 248). The circumstances

presented in this case go well beyond the ordinary and plain
request for bids addressed in Rapp.
Furthermore, the Rapp case did not address the fundamental
principles of contract law discussed below which, when applied to
13

the particular facts of this case clearly establish a mutuality of
obligation on the part of the parties and contractual obligations
between Wadsworth and Salt Lake County.

None of these important

distinctions or issues were addressed by the Court of Appeals and
require attention by the Supreme Court in deciding the issues
presented on this appeal.

C.
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion Fails to Address the Issue
Whether the Mutual Obligations Agreed to by Wadsworth in Return for
the County's Obligation to Award to Wadsworth Created Mutual
Contractual Obligations.
The Court of Appeals1 did not address the effect of the mutual
obligations and consideration between the parties which establish
the contract asserted by Wadsworth.

The County bid documents and

ordinance required award and contract with Wadsworth as the low
responsible bidder.

In return Wadsworth undertook significant

contractual obligations.

Without addressing these issues, the

impact of the Court of Appeals1 decision that no contractual
obligation exists on the part of the County is that the obligations
purportedly imposed by the County, and other municipalities, in its
bid instructions and documents are illusory and unenforceable.
When Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the
contract
Swinerton

to

the

lowest

& Walberg

responsible

bidder

under

Company v. City of Inglewood,

Cal.App.3d 104, 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974).

§

18-1-1.
etc., 40

The County's

promise to award the contract to the low responsible bidder was
supported by consideration in the form of Wadsworth's covenants,
inter alia, to hold the bid open for sixty days, to provide a bid
14

bond, and to be liable for contractual liquidated damages if it
failed to perform the project if the low bidder.
Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to the
low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or other
consideration, such as the covenants made by Wadsworth, the promise
is enforceable

and a binding

contract

is formed.

Resource

Management Co. v Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985);
Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah
1980).

Wadsworth1s remedy for breach of such contract is recovery

from the County of Wadsworth1s lost profits.

Alexander v. Brown,

646 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).
Although the commission purported to reject Wadsworthfs bid,
this is not the same as disapproving the contract itself but rather
a breach of the contract already approved, authorized and required
by

the

County's

Wadsworth's

bid

ordinance.
was

The

restricted.

County's

right

§

of

18-1-5

to

the

reject
County's

ordinances only allows rejection of a bid for a "valid reason" and
is limited to where the bidder is not "responsible".
undisputed that Wadsworth is a responsible contractor.

It is
Where no

valid reason for rejecting the bid exists, the purported rejection
of the bid cannot be construed as disapproval of the bid process
or contract authorized and required by § 18-1-1.
In Butler v. Federal Way School Dist. No. 210, 562 P.2d 271
(Wash.App.1977), the Court upheld an award of monetary damages for
wrongful rejection of a contractor's bid.

The Court held that

where applicable ordinances limit the right to reject bids, as does
15

§ 18-1-5 in this case, the request for bids is itself an offer to
contract with the low responsible bidder. Id. at 275.

When the

contractor submits the low responsible bid, the contractor has a
statutory right to award of the contract, absent valid reasons for
rejection of the bid.

Id. at 275.

Where the bid is improperly

rejected, the contractor is entitled to monetary damages for the
breach.

Id. at 276. The limitations in § 18-1-1 on rejections of

bids in this case, is another important distinction from the Rapp
case. Where Wadsworth was undisputedly the low responsible bidder
but was nevertheless rejected5, it is entitled to recover its
damages suffered as a result of such wrongful rejection.
The County contends that there is no contract until formal
award and signing of the construction contract. However, "the fact
that part of the performance is that the parties will enter into
a contract in the future does not render the original agreement any
less binding."

Allen Steel Company v. Deseret Title Holding

Corporation, 119 Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (October 6, 1989) . The pre-award
mutual covenants and obligations between Wadsworth and the County
clearly establish a binding contractual obligation on the part of
both parties to enter into the construction contract upon which the
bid was based.

The Court of Appeals also failed to address the issue of
whether or not Wadsworthfs bid was wrongfully rejected.
The
implication from the opinion is that actions by municipalities in
awarding or rejecting bids are not subject to review even if in
contravention of the governing ordinances or statutes. This is an
important question of municipal law which should be decided by this
Court.
16

The Court of Appealsf opinion does not address these issues
or the incongruity of the County's argument that there is no
contract despite the mutual obligations of the parties.

The

obligations the County imposed upon Wadsworth can only be binding
if there is some consideration to support these obligations.

The

consideration here, is the County's obligation to award to the low
bidder.

The issue has widespread impact in the construction

industry as to the effect, enforceability and validity of preaward covenants and bid bonds between the municipality and the
competitive bidder.

The Supreme Court should consider and rule

upon these issues which are central to the appeal but ignored by
the Court of Appeals.
POINT II
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF MUNICIPAL
AND STATE LAW EFFECTING THE OPERATION AND INTEGRITY OF
THE PUBLIC COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF
UTAH AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
The Court must consider the effect and ramifications on the
entire public competitive bidding system in the State of Utah if
the Court holds there is no contractual obligation.

Salt Lake

County, as well as most state agencies and municipalities in the
State of Utah, impose important obligations on public bidding
contractors to hold bids open for specified time periods, to
provide bid bonds to guarantee the contractor will perform if the
low bidder, and provisions for contractual liquidated damages for
withdrawing a low bid and refusing to perform the work for the bid
amount.

17

The result of the Court of Appeal's decision that there is no
contractual obligation between the parties is to open the door for
low bidders on public projects to ignore these important bid
provisions designed to protect the municipality.

If the bid is

merely an offer and there is no contractual obligation on the
County to award to the low bidder, then there cannot be any
contractual

obligation

on

the

bidder

and

the

obligations

purportedly accompanying the bid are also unenforceable.

Low

bidders will be permitted to withdraw their bids after opening and
then negotiate for higher prices between its low bid and the next
low bid.

The integrity of the bidding system will be destroyed.

This threat to the foundation of public competitive bidding
undermines the purpose of such bidding.

The Court of Appeals1

opinion points out that the competitive bidding is for the benefit
of the public. Opinion, p.4. The bidding process is also intended
to provide a fair forum for bidders. Piatt Elec. Sup, Inc. v. City
of Seattle Div. of Pur, 555 P.2d 421, 426 (Wash.App. 1976) .

The

protection of the public and integrity of the bidding process
requires meaningful enforcement of the ordinances governing the
bidding process, i.e. monetary damages to wrongfully rejected
bidders.

Otherwise, contractors will lose faith in the bidding

process, fewer contractors will bid, less competition will result
and the public will pay higher prices.

If the bidding laws

regulations are not adequately enforceable by those participating,
then such regulations are rendered ineffectual and the intended
protection of the public and bidding contractors illusory.
18

The practical necessity of providing an adequate remedy in the
form of monetary damages was recognized in Airline Const, v.
Ascension Parish School, 549 So.2d 1240 (La.App. 1989), where the
Court rejected the argument that a wrongfully rejected bidder was
limited to injunctive relief only and could not recover monetary
damages.
We believe these cases recognize that it would be unfair
to establish a rule under which aggrieved bidders would
in all instances be barred from obtaining monetary
damages for violations of the Public Contracts Law. The
inequities of such a ruling are particularly telling in
situations wherein an aggrieved bidder files an
injunction suit prior to or immediately in response to
an alleged wrongful award of a contract, but due to the
lapse of time before a determination on the merits can
be made, the project is near completion. The bidder in
reality may no longer enjoin the project. It would be
unfair to rule that the bidder in this scenario would not
be entitled to some relief, perhaps in the form of
monetary damages.
Id. at 1246.

The need to provide an adequate monetary remedy is

particularly evident where Wadsworth promptly filed this action and
sought injunctive relief and where the remedy of injunctive relief
failed as the result of the extended hearings and lapse of time
which rendered injunctive relief impractical.
The ordinances and bidding instructions in this case have a
dual purpose to protect the bidders as well as the general public.
Piatt Elec. , 555 P. 2d at 426.

Both purposes suffer if Wadsworth

is denied a remedy since the County would then be given free reign
to arbitrarily ignore its obligation under the ordinance with
impunity,

thereby

undermining

the

integrity

and

value

of

competitive bidding. Where Wadsworth's bid was wrongfully rejected
in violation of the ordinance and written covenants of the County,
19

an appropriate remedy must be fashioned to effectuate the purposes
of public competitive bidding. These important issues of municipal
and state law go to the heart of the public competitive bidding
process in this state and should be decided by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals1 opinion ignores and fails to address
primary and significant issues presented by Wadsworth on this
appeal.

The Court of Appeals1 failure to address or rule upon the

central issues presented on appeal is a departure from the accepted
and usual judicial procedure, and calls for review by the Supreme
Court. Normal judicial process and fundamental fairness requires,
at a minimum, that the issues presented to the Court of Appeals be
addressed and ruled upon and not simply ignored.

Furthermore, the

issues regarding the purpose and integrity of public competitive
bidding, protection of the public, and the need for a meaningful
remedy to wrongfully rejected bidders to enforce the public bidding
laws are important issues of municipal and state law which should
be

decided

by

the

Supreme

Court.

Wadsworth,

therefore,

respectfully requests that its Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
review of the Court of Appeals' decision be granted.
Dated this /Jjr

day of January, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Memorandum were mailed, United States Mail, first class,
postage prepaid, this l^^day of January, 1992 to the following:
David E. Yocum
Jeffery H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction

DEC 171991

;^ar/ 1' Noonso
ORDER DENY$f®^" ? h e C o u r t
PETITION FOR RfiRBJti&JWEJ A PP e a l s

Company, Inc,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case NO. 900234-CA

Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah;
R. P. Holdsworth, Director, The
Salt Lake County Flood Control
Division,
Defendants and Appellants.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed October 15, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

,4^ day

!(C

FOR THE COURT:

Mary T/Noonan
C l e r k \ / f . - t h e court

of December, 1991.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of December, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties
listed below:
David E. Yocom
Salt Lake County Attorney
Jeffrey H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Fitts
Beesley & Fairclough
Attorneys at Law
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 17th day of December, 1991.

By - _J/t

U

*;<Vc;//_/Tn

Deputy Cl£rk
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(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 900234-CA
v.
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subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. Holdsworth,
Director, The Salt Lake County
Flood Control Division,
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(September 30, 1991)

Defendants and Appellants.
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Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable James S. Sawaya
Attorneys:

M J K W T Noonan
Clerkc : --Court
Utah Co-.*.» or Appeals
David E. Yocom and Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Wilford A. Beesley and Stanford P. Fitts, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. (Wadsworth)
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works project in Salt
Lake County (the County) and sued for damages on contract and
negligence theories. The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages
for lost profits on a motion for summary judgment and the County
appealed. We reverse and remand.
I.

FACTS

On July 8, 1985, the County invited competitive, sealed bids
by advertisement for construction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood
control project on Millcreek. The bid advertisement contained
instructions and rules governing the bid. 1 Wadsworth received

1. The bid instructions required unit prices to be written in
ink or typed both in words and numerals. The instructions
(continued...)

the bid advertisement and, along with Gerber Concrete
Construction, Inc. (Gerber), bid the project. When the bids were
opened and the figures read publicly, Wadsworth was designated as
the apparent low bidder, pending final approval by the County
Board of Commissioners (the Board).
The County consulting engineers subsequently reviewed the
bids and discovered irregularities in Wadsworth's bid. In
addition to minor computation errors that could be corrected,
Wadsworth1s bid contained a six digit figure that had been
penciled in above another number written in ink for the cost of
the line item "basin floodwall." Both numbers were added to
other line items in separate calculations of the subtotal for the
concrete floodwalls. Two different numbers appeared, one in pen
and one in ink, in the subtotal column on the bid schedule. The
pencil and ink figures from the subtotal column on the bid
schedule were again listed in the summary of subtotals and
entered in the box for the total bid price. The figures
reflected substantial price differences. Wadsworth's total high
and low figures straddled Gerber1s total bid price. The
consultants recommended that the Board reject Wadsworth's bid as
not responsive to the bid request.
On August 14, 1985, the Board held a public hearing to
review the bid proposals. At the hearing, Wadsworth argued the
Board could waive the irregularities. Wadsworth had previously
sent a letter to the County shortly after bids were opened to
clarify the "confusion as to which number should be used." A
county attorney advised against waiver, and the Board rejected
Wadsworth's bid as not responsive and awarded the contract to
Gerber. Wadsworth then sought to enjoin Gerber from starting
construction by filing suit in district court, but the court
allowed the work to go forward.
When the flood control project was completed, the County
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the equitable
relief Wadsworth sought had been rendered moot and that Wadsworth
was not entitled to the damages requested. The court granted the
motion in part and denied injunctive relief, but ruled that
Wadsworth could seek damages for wrongful rejection of its bid.
Wadsworth then moved for summary judgment and was awarded damages
for lost profits on contract and negligence theories. The County
appealed.

1. (...continued)
expressly prohibited erasure, interlineation or other correction
unless such corrections were authenticated by the signature of
the person signing the bid.
900234-CA
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook. 604
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). Because disposition of a case by
summary judgment denies the benefit of trial on the merits, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing
party. Reeves v. Geiav Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 640
(Utah App. 1988). Moreover, because summary judgment is granted
as a matter of law, we are free to reappraise the legal
conclusion of the trial court. Luckv Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark.
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988).
III.
A.

REJECTION OF THE BID
Contractual Theory

The issue of whether an unsuccessful bidder on a public
works project is entitled to contractual damages was decided in
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). In Rapp. the
supreme court denied recovery of damages by an aggrieved bidder
under either express or implied contract theories. Id. at 655.
"An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not itself an offer," the
court reasoned, "rather the bid or tender is an offer which
creates no rights until accepted." Id. at 654. The supreme
court also acknowledged that, pursuant to ordinance, formal
acceptance by the governing authority was required to create a
binding contract. Id.
In the present case, the Board is empowered by ordinance to
make contracts on behalf of the County. No contract is binding
on the County, however, until it has been approved by the Board
or authorized by ordinance or resolution.2 In this case, the
Board did not approve Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it
before any work was commenced on the project. Therefore, no
contract was created, either express or implied, that would give
Wadsworth contractual rights. Accordingly, damages for

2. Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances, § 2.04.100
(1990).
The commission shall make or authorized [sic] the
making of all contracts to which the county may be a
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf
of or be binding on the county unless it is reduced to
writing and approved by the commission, or expressly
authorized by ordinance or resolution.
Wadsworth presents no argument that a binding contract was
created by ordinance or resolution. Accordingly, we do not
address either of those provisions of the ordinance.
900234-CA

3

anticipated lost profits were inappropriate under either express
or implied contract theories.
B.

Negligence Theory

The issue of whether a contractor who is the apparent low
bidder on a public works contract is entitled to recover damages
for lost profits for wrongful rejection of its bid is a case of
first impression in Utah. A substantial majority of the
jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue have not allowed an
aggrieved low bidder to recover damages for the failure of a
public body to award a contract.3 We adopt the majority
approach and hold that damages for lost profits are not
recoverable under negligence theory as a matter of Utah common
law.4
The rationale for our holding is that the laws governing
competitive bidding are enacted for the benefit of the general
taxpaying public and not individual bidders. See Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Clark County. 94 Nev. 116, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978).

A

violation of those laws, therefore, is a breach of a duty owed to
the public and not to an individual. Because damages benefit
only the interest of an individual bidder, an award of damages
for lost profits in such instances is contrary to the very public
interest that the competitive bidding laws were designed to
3. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 480, 556 P.2d
328 (1976); Klinaer v. City of Favetteville, 297 Ark. 385, 762
S.W.2d 388 (1988); Rubino v. Lolli, 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89
Cal.Rptr. 320 (1970); Sutter Bros. Constr. Co. Inc. v. City of
Leavenworth, 238 Kan. 85, 708 P.2d 190 (1985); Baker v. State.
707 P.2d 20 (Mont. 1985); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clark County. 94 Nev.
116, 575 P.2d 1332 (1978); M. A. Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough
of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308 A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J.
315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); R.S. Noonan. Inc. v. School District of
Citv of York. 400 Pa. 391, 162 A.2d 623 (1960); Mottner v. Town
of Mercer Island, 75 Wash.2d 575, 452 P.2d 750 (1969). See also
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 29.86 (3rd
Ed. 1990); Annotation, Public Contracts; Low Bidder's Monetary
Relief against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of Contract. 65
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988); 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts §
86 (1972).
4. Since Wadsworth did not seek to recover its bid preparation
costs, we have no occasion to consider the issue. See Hever
Products Co.. Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 63, 140 F.Supp.
409 (1956)(unsuccessful bidder may recover bid preparation costs
where bids are not invited in good faith). We also note, in
passing, that counties are not included within the scope of the
Utah Procurement Code and the remedies therein provided. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-56-2, -5(12), -5(25), -47 (1989).
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protect. In addition, damages for lost profits further burden
the public coffers already penalized by paying a higher price for
goods or services. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App.
480, 556 P.2d 328, 330 (1976).
IV.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Wadsworth was not entitled to damages for
lost profits under either contract or negligence theories. We
therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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WILFORD A. BEESLEY #0257
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
300 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RALPH L. WADSWORTH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political :
subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH,
:
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION,
:
Defendants.
The Motion

Civil No. C-85-5681
Judge James S. Sawaya

;

of plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth

Construction

Company, Inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the
above entitled Court on November
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.

20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m., the
Plaintiff was represented by

Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq.

The Court, having

considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES:

1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L.

Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby granted as prayed.
2. Defendants were required to award the subject construction
project to the low, responsive, responsible bidder.
3.

Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on

the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project
to plaintiff.
4.
care

Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due

owing

to

plaintiff

in

rejecting

plaintiff's

bid

as

nonresponsive.
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the
date of judgment.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the

statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
this Judgment until paid in full.
Dated this

/*~r

day of December, 1989.

imes S. Sawa^a
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

on

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this _/j/_clay of
December, 1989:
Jeffery H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

